We study a new class of decentralized algorithms for discrete optimization via simulation, which is inspired by the fictitious play algorithm applied to games with identical interests. In this approach, each component of the solution vector of the optimization model is artificially assumed to have a corresponding "player", and the interaction of these players in simulation allows for exploration of the solution space and, for some problems, ultimately results in the identification of the optimal solution. Our algorithms also allow for correlation in players' decision making, a key feature when simulation output is shared by multiple decision-makers. We first establish convergence under finite sampling to equilibrium solutions. In addition, in the context of discrete network flow models, we prove that if the underlying link cost functions are convex, then our algorithms converge almost surely to an optimal solution.
Introduction
The pervasive nature of information technology in modern economies has sparked the development of novel computing schemes in which the resources of many separate computers connected by a network are used to solve large-scale computational problems. For example, the paradigm of "grid computing" offers a model in which a large number of computers form a virtual cluster in order to tackle problems in a massively parallel fashion. Grid computing has so far been a key enabler for distributed scientific computation, particularly in executing complex simulation models, including models for weather and climate, protein folding, and many others applications. While grid computing offers great potential as a tool for scientific computations, it remains to be seen whether the technology will emerge as the "killer infrastructure" for solving complex optimization problems.
Parallel and distributed algorithms for deterministic optimization have been in use for some time. In highly structured problems, it is possible to characterize optimal solutions as fixed points to an appropriately defined finite-dimensional operator and then to distribute component-wise the evaluation of this operator in parallel and asynchronous successive approximation schemes (see, for example, Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1989) ). Alternatively, gradient-free methods, including simplicial search algorithms (Dennis and Torczon (1991) , Hough and Meza (2002) ) can be implemented in a parallel fashion and can be quite effective.
For optimization models that lack special structure, including discrete problems with large sets of feasible solutions, parallelism is most easily leveraged by distributing the evaluation of candidate solutions. For example, global search algorithms such as simulated annealing benefit directly from the parallel evaluation of solutions in the neighborhood of the current iterate (see, for example, the single/multi-walk taxonomy in Kliewer and Tschöke (2000) ). To give a name to this type of approach, we say that an algorithm conforms to a Centralized-Search/Distributed-Evaluation (CSDE) computational model if it involves (i) a centralized search entity that serves to compare objective function values of candidate solutions and generates the new incumbent solution(s) and (ii) a distributed set of evaluation entities that serve to evaluate new candidate solutions in parallel. The CSDE model is quite general, and most distributed combinatorial optimization algorithms reported in the literature fall into this category (Ferreira and Pardalos (1996) ), reflecting the fact that, for many applications, the effort of directing the search is dominated by the burden of evaluating individual solutions.
A significant complicating factor in the application of global search methods is the presence of noise in objective function evaluation, as, for example, in discrete optimization via simulation.The easiest and perhaps most common means of addressing this type of uncertainty is to ignore it. Indeed in practice, genetic/evolutionary algorithms, simulated annealing, and tabu search are frequently employed in conjunction with simulation-based evaluation of candidate solutions, and the usual practice is to ensure that the error is "negligible" by determining in advance the amount of simulation data to be gathered. Ranking and selection techniques and/or multiple comparison procedures (see Swisher et al. (2004) for an overview) are frequently used in conjunction with global search methods in a two-phase process of (i) generating a small list of can-didate solutions via global optimization and (ii) subsequently selecting the best candidate solution via either ranking and selection or multiple comparisons. While the literature on distributed algorithms for discrete optimization via simulation is surprisingly sparse (cf. Chen et al. (1996) , Luo et al. (2000) ), it seems that the most common approach is to employ the two-phase methodology described above and to implement each phase of the process via CSDE, so that parallelism is only leveraged in the evaluation of candidate solutions and not in the search for new candidate solutions. While the two-phase approach seems reasonable from an engineering perspective, it suffers from the drawback that the final process of validating the "best" solution is divorced from the initial process of generating a small set of candidate solutions.
In this paper, we depart from the CSDE model in developing a novel approach to discrete optimization via simulation. Based on the fictitious play algorithm of game theory (Brown (1949) ), we explore a simple, yet powerful, means of distributing both the search functionality and the evaluation functionality of a global search method, essentially adopting a Distributed-Search/Distributed-Evaluation (DSDE) computational model. The algorithm we propose takes advantage of grid-like computational infrastructure to obtain solutions that are, with a high degree of certainty, either optimal or nearly optimal, within a single phase of operation, unifying the formerly separate processes of (i) generating candidate solutions within a large solution space and (ii) validating the best candidates through repeated trials. We address discrete optimization via simulation problems of the form:
(1) where 1. H(a) is a random variable, defined on an appropriate probability space, that represents the cost or disutility associated with the design setting or control strategy a within the set of feasible solutions A, 2. instead of having a closed-form expression for the expected value U (a) we only have on-demand access to samples of random variable H(a) (e.g. through calls to a high fidelity simulation of the system), and 3. the set of feasible decisions A is a Cartesian product of sets:
where each A i , i = 1, . . . n is finite.
We assume that the computing grid available to solve this problem consists of a cluster of n computers, and we allocate discretion over A i to the i-th computer. In this way, the aggregate decision of the cluster, say a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A, constitutes a feasible solution. We assume that each computer devoted to this problem is capable of accessing (or generating) noisy estimatesŪ (a) of the expected cost U (a) via simulation.
The design of a distributed optimization algorithm in this context amounts to specifying the processes by which each computer uses sample data to revise its controllable inputs iteratively so as to collectively arrive at an optimal solution a * ∈ A. Of course, with each computer acting independently, the net effect of any given stage of this process may not represent an improvement. Therefore, in order to not simply replicate a distributed implementation of random search, some additional structure must be imposed on the way the cluster of computers operates. The structure that we impose in this paper involves thinking of each element α ∈ A i as an "action" that can be selected by the i-th computer toward the goal of contributing to a globally optimal solution. Thus, our approach is naturally linked to non-cooperative game theory, where each computer in the cluster can be viewed in mathematical terms as a "player" in a game of identical interests.
Our principle contribution in this paper is to advance a new class of DSDE Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (SJSFP) algorithms for discrete optimization via simulation problems. At the highest level, our main results are that we have established (i) the basic convergence properties of this class of algorithms and
(ii) that for a large class of discrete network flow problems, the SJSFP algorithm will converge within a single phase of operation to a globally optimal solution.
We use the term "sampled joint strategy fictitious play" to reflect the fact that in our computational approach all n computers assigned to solve the optimization problem of Equation (1) interact with one another by individually best-replying at each stage t to some finite history of solutions generated up to time t. Since each computer in this scheme has access to a common history of solutions generated by the cluster, we think of the SJSFP approach as actually being a decentralized (as opposed to a fully "distributed") algorithm for discrete optimization via simulation. From a game-theoretic view, processes that require individual players to best reply to the history of play are known as fictitious play algorithms (see Brown (1949) , Robinson (1951) , Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and the references contained therein); however, this interpretation of our work requires an important caveat. Specifically, in the approach considered in this paper, each player (say the i-th computer) models the joint behavior of all other players as though they are working together, i.e. in a correlated fashion, thus the moniker "joint strategy fictitious play" 1 .
The assumption that all other players are acting in a correlated fashion represents a point of departure from the conventional view of fictitious play. In the conventional view, each player assumes that all other players behave according to independent mixed strategies derived from the history of play. The distinction between players that assume the behavior of others as independent or correlated was noted by Monderer and Sela (1997) who termed the former as IFP (independent fictitious play) players and the latter as JFP (joint fictitious play) players. While the difference may appear to be subtle, it turns out that the assumption of correlation has a significant effect on the limiting behavior of the algorithm. Vanderschraaf is the first researcher to analyze a joint strategy fictitious play approach to learning in games and established that if the algorithm converges, it converges to an Endogenous Correlated Equilibrium (ECE), not necessarily a Nash equilibrium (cf. Vanderschraaf (1995) , Vanderschraaf and Richards (1997) , Vanderschraaf (2001) ). More recently, Marden et al. (2005) have analyzed a modification to joint strategy fictitious play that allows for convergence to pure strategy Nash equilibria in weakly acyclic potential games (see Peyton-Young (1998) for more information on weak acyclicity and fictitious play approaches to potential games). One of the key technical results of the present work is that we have established conditions under which the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm converges, almost surely, to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This is in contrast to the technical results recently established for the conventional fictitious play algorithm in Monderer and Shapley (1996) , where a weaker form of convergence is shown, i.e., along subsequences to mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Set convergence results of this type, while interesting, leave something to be desired. In practice one faces the technical difficulties of (1) having to isolate such convergent subsequences and (2) having to recognize mixed strategy equilibria along the way. While the fact that SJSFP converges almost surely to pure strategy Nash equilibria is certainly of interest within the literature on learning in games, the main implication of this result for us is that our baseline decentralized procedure is guaranteed to produce consistent results, and more specifically in situations where (i) the optimization model admits only a single Nash equilibrium and (ii) this Nash equilibrium is a globally optimal solution (as in the discrete network flow problem considered in the sequel), the SJSFP algorithm is guaranteed to work.
We now briefly outline the remainder of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce the essential mathematical notation and basic concepts, including (i) the notion of weak inclusive sets and (ii) details of the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm. In Section 3, we establish a key technical result, namely conditions for the convergence of the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, we also define a modified version of the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm that allows for noisy (simulation-based) cost evaluation, and we establish that this algorithm retains the key convergence property. In Section 4, we show that a class of discrete network flow problems has the property that the SJSFP algorithm converges to a pure Nash equilibrium, corresponding to a globally optimal solution for the problem. We illustrate this result with numerical experiments relating to an internet traffic engineering problem. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5 with some brief comments on the scalability of our approach.
2 Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play
Game Theoretic Model for DSDE Optimization
As we are interested in solving stochastic optimization problems of the form of (1) and (2), our gametheoretic model for discrete optimization via simulation considers a finite set of players N = {1, . . . , n},
with each "player" corresponding to an element of the solution vector, assigned to a computer (or computational unit) within a cluster or grid. Each player i ∈ N , has a (finite) set of feasible actions A i (in game theoretic terminology, A i would correspond to player i's available set of strategies). We denote by A = n i=1 A i , the set of joint actions (equivalently, joint strategies) and will denote its cardinality by m = |A|. We can explicitly enumerate A in terms of the m possible joint actions as A = {a(1), a(2), . . . , a(m)}. If a(k) is the k-th joint action in A then player i's contributed action will be represented as a i (k). The action profile of all players (other than player i) associated with joint action a(k) is denoted, a −i (k) ∈ j =i A j . In order to isolate player i's action in a joint action, say the k-th one, we shall use the notation a(k) = (a i (k), a −i (k)) (i.e., in terms of player i's contribution and the action profile associated with the remaining players).
We shall denote by U (a(k)) the system-level disutility (cost), associated with joint action a(k), perceived equally by all players. Let us denote by Λ, the set of all possible probability distributions over the joint action or joint strategy set A, i.e.,
m k=1 λ(k) = 1 . We interpret λ(k) to be the probability that joint action a(k) ∈ A is chosen under probability distribution λ ∈ Λ.
Player i's probability of choosing an action α from his or her action set A i , denoted by λ i [α] , is calculated by summing up the probabilities of all joint actions where action α appears as player i's contribution. More formally,
Similarly, given a profile of actions a −i ∈ j =i A j (i.e., actions for all players other than player i), the probability of experiencing a −i under λ ∈ Λ is
Thus, under λ ∈ Λ, the expected level of system disutility perceived by a player i who insists on deviating from λ i by using a particular action α ∈ A i is,
Conforming to the joint strategy interpretation of fictitious play, we assert that given a probability distribution λ ∈ Λ over joint actions (or joint strategies), each player i ∈ N believes all other players will play (possibly, in a correlated fashion) in accordance with λ −i , and we define the i-th player's best reply to λ as the action in his/her action set that minimizes U (α, λ −i ), i.e.,
where B i (λ) is a set if more than one α ∈ A i achieves the minimum. Note that in defining "best replies" in this way, we depart from the conventional interpretation of fictitious play in which a player's belief is that all others play independently and the expected disutility of an action
The two interpretations of fictitious play are in fact distinct since in general
for any joint action a ∈ A. As the joint strategy interpretation of fictitious play essentially assumes that each player believes that all other players act in a correlated fashion, we say that the best reply process of Equation (4) "accounts for correlation".
Since computing best replies according to Equation (4) may be computationally expensive, we shall only require each player i ∈ N to sample a single joint action,â i , uniformly and independently from the probability distribution over joint actions (or joint strategies) λ and best reply to it. The single sample, in effect, will constitute player i's estimate of the probability distribution over joint actions and this estimated probability distribution will be denoted by 1 {â i } where for any k ∈ {1, . . . , m},
Accordingly the notion of best reply for an individual player i ∈ N to the estimated λ can be simply rewritten as:
If there is more than one best reply, then the choice is made in a uniform random manner. Thus, if a player is indifferent between s = |B i (1 {â i } )| actions, the likelihood of choosing any of these actions as a best reply is 1 s and this choice is denoted
The Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play Algorithm
We now introduce the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm. To begin, let us define a construct called the play history, denoted by H t , which is a record of the past M joint actions taken by all players up to (and including) time-instant t − 1 (where t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and M is the size of the finite history we will be maintaining). The l-th entry in H t will be denoted by H t (l). Thus, if {a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a t−1 } ⊂ A is the sequence of joint actions played in the first t instances of the game then for t ≥ M , we have H t ≡ {a t−M , . . . , a t−2 , a t−1 } and we define
The formal statement of the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm is presented next:
Algorithm 1 (Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play) For some fixed number M > m, starting with an initial, arbitrarily chosen, joint action a 0 ∈ A and play history H 1 = {a 0 }, at time-instant t, the play history at stage t + 1, i.e., H t+1 , is computed recursively as follows.
1. Each player i ∈ N uniformly and independently samples a single joint actionâ t,i from H t .
Each player i ∈ N computes their individual best reply
3. The aggregate best reply is set to
Hence {λ t M } ∞ t=1 in the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm is seen to be evolving according to the equation,
for all a ∈ A, where the indicator 1 {H t (k)=a} takes the value one if the k-th entry in H t is a and zero otherwise.
The existing analytic results for fictitious play and variants, under deterministic evaluation of cost, show convergence to Nash equilibria on subsequences: a weaker form of convergence. In this paper, we demonstrate conditions under which the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm converges, almost surely, under both perfect and noisy cost evaluation, and this forms the topic for the next section.
Convergence of Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play and Extensions
In this section we establish the convergence of the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm to pure strategy Nash equilibria, under deterministic cost evaluation. Also, we develop an extension of the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm, for problems where cost evaluation is simulation based (and hence noisy), that retains the same desirable convergence properties.
Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play under Deterministic Cost Evaluation
We start this section by recalling the notion of inclusive sets due to Sanchirico (1996) which forms the starting point for our analysis of Algorithm 1.
Definition 1 (Inclusive Set) [Sanchirico (1996) ] A non-empty subset of joint actions E = n i=1 E i ⊆ A is said to be inclusive if and only if B i (λ) ⊆ E i for all i ∈ N and probability distributions λ such that the support of λ −i is in E −i = j =i E j . Moreover, an inclusive set E is said to be minimally inclusive if it contains no other inclusive set.
In a rough sense, this definition says that if a player i ∈ N were to best reply to any probability distribution with positive weight only on joint actions from an inclusive set E, then the best reply would lie within the action set E i ⊆ A i . For the analysis in this paper, we shall need a weaker version of this concept, which we refer to as weak inclusive sets and define below.
Definition 2 (Weak Inclusive Set) A non-empty subset of joint actions E = n i=1 E i ⊆ A is said to be weak inclusive if and only if B i (1 {a} ) ⊆ E i for all a ∈ E and i ∈ N . Moreover, a weak inclusive set E is said to be minimally weak inclusive if it contains no other weak inclusive set.
Rather than requiring a player's best reply to be in E i for any probability distribution over E the notion of "weak inclusiveness" only imposes this requirement for those degenerate probability distributions over E that place all their weight on a single joint action. We next establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Algorithm 1 converges to a weak inclusive set with probability one.
Proof: As the number of joint actions in A is finite, for any sample path {a t } ∞ t=0 generated by Algorithm 1 some joint action, sayā 0 , must be played infinitely often. We will next show that conditional on the sample path {a t } ∞ t=0 , at any of the infinitely many occurrences ofā 0 there is a strict positive probability of converging to a weak inclusive set. Define P(S) to be the product set of best replies associated with any set S ⊆ A. Hence,
where
the following procedure where starting with S 1 = {ā 0 } and t = 1, at any iteration t the following steps are taken.
•
Step 1: If B(ā t−1 ) ∩ S t = ∅ then setā t to any joint action from the set B(ā t−1 ) and go to Step 3.
Otherwise go to
Step 2.
Step 2: If P(S t ) \ S t = ∅ then setā t to any joint action from the set P(S t ) \ S t and go to Step 3.
Otherwise set τ = t and stop.
• Step 3: Set S t+1 = {S t ,ā t } and t = t + 1. Go to Step 1.
Since for any t,ā t−1 =ā t and the number of distinct joint actions in A is m, this construction terminates at some finite iteration τ ≤ m with S τ = {ā 0 ,ā 1 , . . . ,ā τ −1 }. The stepwise procedure describing the construction of S τ represents a finite path of distinct joint actions that can be taken by Algorithm 1 with strictly positive probability, conditional on the sample path {a t } ∞ t=0 . Note that with M > m, the size of the play history is sufficient to contain any sequence of distinct joint actions. Now P(S τ ) = S τ (refer to stopping condition in Step 2 above), and by construction P(S τ ) is weak inclusive, hence S τ must be weak inclusive as well. Now S τ , the finite path constructed, must be played infinitely often along the given sample path. So, whenever S τ is in the play history, there is a strictly positive probability (conditional on the given sample path {a t } ∞ t=0 ) that the players will successively sample and best reply to joint actions chosen exclusively from S τ until all M joint actions in the finite play history are from S τ . Once this occurs, as S τ is weak inclusive all further joint actions generated by Algorithm 1 would then have to be from S τ .
We next make the following assumption about the nature of local optima.
Assumption 1 All pure strategy Nash equilibria are strict. Sanchirico (1996) shows that in games of identical interests where all pure strategy Nash equilibria are strict, the minimally inclusive sets are singletons consisting of the pure Nash equilibria (cf. Theorem 1).
We next establish a corollary showing that for games of identical interests, minimally weak inclusive sets are singletons consisting of pure strategy Nash equilibrium as well. Though this corollary can be inferred from Theorem 1 of Sanchirico (1996) , our proof is more succinct (as it is specialized to the notion of "weak inclusiveness") and is included for the sake of completeness.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, a set E is minimally weak inclusive if and only if E is a singleton consisting of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We only show the "if" part. By way of contradiction, let E = n i=1 E i be a minimally weak inclusive set that is not a singleton. Next let
It can be verified that strict pure strategy Nash equilibria are weak minimally inclusive sets so by our hypothesis, a * cannot be one. Thus there exists a player i with a best reply B i (1 {a * } ) such that (i) the joint action
to Equation (5).
We are now in a position to establish the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, the sequence {λ t M } ∞ t=1 , generated by Algorithm 1 converges with probability 1 to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Lemma 1 shows that Algorithm 1 converges to a weak inclusive set, with probability one. Next let Algorithm 1 converge to the weak inclusive set E, for a sample path {a t } ∞ t=0 (generated by Algorithm 1). As E is weak inclusive it follows that there exists a minimally weak inclusive set i.e., a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (cf. Corollary 1) say a * ∈ E. It can be inferred from Lemma 1 that all joint actions in E are visited infinitely often. Thus, a t = a * infinitely often. Consequently there also exists a subsequence
we can work with a subsubsequence for which the time intervals between appearances of a * is greater than or equal to M . Now let C k denote the event, where starting at time-instant t(k) the process converges to a * .
Note that convergence to a * would occur after a sequence of M consecutive best replies consisting of a * .
Thus,
In other words, P (a t = a * eventually|a t = a * infinitely often) = 1.
Convergence of Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play under Noisy Cost Evaluation
We now address problems for which an analytical representation of performance, i.e., the specific functional form for U (·), is unavailable and where performance is evaluated instead through stochastic simulation.
Therefore, we modify Algorithm 1 to account for this, while making the following assumption regarding the simulations.
Assumption 2 Performance estimates of joint actions obtained from simulations are independent and identically distributed. Specifically,Ū t,i (a(k)) the simulation's output accessed by the i-th player, for joint outcome a(k), at time-instant t, is of the form:
that is to say, it equals the true value U (a(k)) plus a zero mean, bounded variance error term δ t,i (i.e.,
Under the DSDE model, this corresponds to players conducting independent simulations of joint actions from which noise-corrupted, though identically distributed performance estimates are obtained. Furthermore as simulations are computationally expensive, we shall leverage the availability of any past simulation data in the individual best reply computations by taking the disutility value of any joint action to be the average of the performance estimates from all previous simulations of that joint action. Let N t (a) be the number of simulations of joint action a conducted by all players up to (and including) time-instant t andÛ t (a) to be the sample average of the performance estimates obtained from the N t (a) simulations. Thus,
We note that maintaining these performance estimates can be done recursively. Finally we denote,
to be player i's best reply set to the joint action,â t,i , sampled at time-instant t. If there is more than one best-response, the choice is to be made in a uniformly randomized manner and will be denotedβ i (1 {â t,i } ) ∈ B i (1 {â t,i } ).
Thus a modified algorithm to handle noisy performance evaluation is obtained by replacing the β i (1 {â t,i } ) for all i ∈ N in Steps 2 and 3 of Algorithm 1 withβ i (1 {â t,i } ). In the remainder of the paper, the resulting noisy sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm will be referred to as Algorithm 2 and we establish its convergence properties next.
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the sequence {λ t M } ∞ t=0 generated by Algorithm 2 converges with probability one to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Analogous to Lemma 1, we can show that Algorithm 2 converges to a weak inclusive set with probability one. To see this first observe that along a sample path {a t } ∞ t=1 generated by Algorithm 2, for any joint action a that is played infinitely often, N t (a) → ∞. Second there being strictly positive probability of a being sampled by any player i, the process of computing best replies ensures that for any α ∈ A i the joint actions (α, a −i ) are simulated infinitely often. Under Assumption 2, as performance estimates are independent and identically distributed, by the Strong Law of Large Numbers, we have P (lim Nt(a)→∞Ût (α, a −i ) = U (α, a −i )) = 1. As performance estimates get arbitrarily refined, it must be the case that the finite path constructed in Lemma 1 is eventually followed infinitely often, along the given sample path. Thus, Algorithm 2 converges to a weak inclusive set with probability one. Next the argument goes much like in Theorem 1. Let Algorithm 2 converge to the weak inclusive set E, for a sample path {a t } ∞ t=0 . Next there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium a * ∈ E that is played infinitely often. If A * denotes the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria, define a quantity γ which is the least amount of sub-optimality for any joint action differing in one action from a joint action in A * . Thus
As γ is finite (and strictly positive), we can infer that if joint actions in a weak inclusive set are played infinitely often, eventually the errors due to simulation of a * goes below γ. Thus from some time-instant T * onwards, a * starts appearing in the sequence with all players having access to its "true" performance estimate. So, there exists a subsequence {a t(k) } ∞ k=0 such that a t(k) = a * and where without loss of generality we assume that t(k) − t(k − 1) ≥ M for k ≥ 1 and t(0) ≥ T * . Let us denote by C k the event in which, starting at time-instant t(k), the process converges to a * . Next it can be shown, as in Theorem 1, that P (∩ ∞ k=1 C c k ) = 0 or P (a t = a * eventually|a t = a * infinitely often) = 1.
We next discuss potential stopping rules for Algorithm 2.
Stopping Rules
Conceptually, a stopping rule for sampled joint strategy fictitious play under deterministic cost evaluation would be to check, at each iteration t (or at pre-specified intervals), whether the play history consists entirely of the same joint action a or in other words if λ t M (a) = 1, for some a ∈ A. If this is the case, we know a is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Note that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, with respect to the neighborhood of joint actions that differ in a single action from it, satisfies local optimality (no player can deviate from their pure strategy in a Nash equilibrium at strictly lower cost). In our experience, the algorithm typically reveals good solutions fairly quickly, but owing to the probabilistic nature of choosing joint actions from the play history, once a Nash equilibrium is uncovered, the time taken for the play history to fill up with the same joint action can be large. Thus a more proactive approach is called for, and an alternative that seems to work better in practice is to check for local optimality of joint actions that satisfy some pre-defined performance criteria (on objective function value or standard error of estimates, for instance). This local optimality check can be implemented elegantly, in-situ, by periodically having players best reply to the joint action that is the current candidate for being a local optima (in our implementations we use the joint action that is the best so far based on performance evaluation). If the joint action is repeated in the play history,
i.e., no player wants to deviate, the check holds true, Algorithm 2 can be stopped and the joint action in question reported as a Nash equilibrium solution provided the standard error associated with this joint action is acceptable. As in other simulation-based optimization algorithms, this stopping rule can be applied in conjunction with a computational budget that places user-defined bounds on the number of joint action evaluations or overall iterations. Thus, if the computational budget is exhausted (and the stopping rule has not been invoked), one can adopt strategies that are commonly used in the optimization community, namely either (1) report as a solution the joint action that is the best so far, i.e., has the best performance measure among all joint actions observed during the optimization run or (2) restart the optimization process with the initializing action being the best so far for some previous optimization run. From a practical perspective, stopping rules for sampled joint strategy fictitious play under noisy cost evaluation, are more desirable, but similar stopping rules can also be applied to Algorithm 1. Finally, we remark that stopping at local optima in complex problems is not undesirable: as even with a finite number of joint actions, without special structure on the problem, proving global optimality requires enumeration (if the quality of the obtained "solution" is unsatisfactory, one can always adopt a restarting strategy).
Sampled Joint Strategy Fictitious Play as a Decentralized Simulationbased Optimization Algorithm
Our convergence results (i.e., Theorems 1 and 2) can be strengthened for an important class of network flow problems. In this section, we show that the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm, converges to the optimal solution for convex network flows. We follow this with some numerical examples and a discussion of the algorithm's scalability.
Optimality of SJSFP for Discrete Network Flow Problems with Convex Link Costs
Consider a network in which players are interested in coordinating their actions such that some systemwide performance measure is optimized. Such situations occur naturally in many contexts, consider internet traffic engineering for instance (cf. Xiao et al. (2000) , Fortz and Thorup (2000) , Elwalid et al. (2001) ).
In principle, one could ascribe player status to data streams moving through an Internet service provider's (ISP) network with the ISP specifically interested in ensuring minimum latency (delay) in the data network for all flows. If we denote the set of players by N = {1, . . . , N } then each player i ∈ N in the network has a set of path choices A i : each path being defined as a sequence of links. Let K = {1, . . . , K} be the set of links in the network where each link k ∈ K is associated with a convex delay function c k :
that maps the total load on the link (for simplicity in the development here, the number of users utilizing the link) to delay on the link. For a joint path choice a = (a 1 , . . . , a N ), let x(a) denote the K × N matrix whose (k, i)-th entry, x k,i , equals one if link k is used by player i along path a i , and zero otherwise. Next let us define X = {x ∈ {0, 1} K×N |x = x(a), a ∈ A} where A = n i=1 A i is the set of joint path choices.
Thus any element of X can be thought of as a routing solution (note that more than one joint path choice could lead to the same routing solution). Now for a routing solution x ∈ X, the total number of users of link k ∈ K is given by N i=1 x k,i . Thus, the problem of minimizing aggregate system delay can be represented by S where
The game of identical interests associated with problem S will be denoted G and given by
where the x k,i 's assume their values from x(a) (the routing solution associated with joint path choice a ∈ A).
With this notation in place, we establish a lemma which shows that, under convexity of the link delay functions, the routing solution associated with a Nash equilibrium solves the aggregate delay minimization problem, given by S.
Lemma 2 If c k is convex for all k ∈ K and a * is Nash equilibrium for the game G then the associated routing solution x(a * ) solves S. Further if c k is strictly convex for all k ∈ K then the Nash equilibrium a * is strict.
Proof: To simplify our exposition, we shall use y k (a) to denote the total number of users of link k ∈ K under a joint path choice a. Hence, we can rewrite Equation (6) as
. Now a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, say a * , always exists for game G (any a * ∈ arg min a∈A U (a) is a Nash equilibrium). Next consider the total link loads y(a) = (y k (a)) K k=1 arising from a joint path choice a ∈ A, that is not a Nash equilibrium. Compared to the Nash equilibrium a * , under an alternate path choice a ∈ A, for any player i the links in the network can be partitioned into three subsets: (1) a subset of links K + (i) that experience an increase in total link load (from that experienced under a * ), (2) a subset of links K − (i) that experience a decrease in total link load and finally (3) a subset of links for which the total link load remains unchanged. Thus, K + (i) are links that are utilized by player i under the alternate joint path choice a (but were not used under a * ) and K − (i) are links that are no longer utilized by player i under the alternate joint path choice a (but were used under a * ). Hence an alternate joint path choice can be represented in terms of how the total link loads under a differ from that under the Nash equilibrium a * by,
and n k denotes the number of new users of link k (i.e., n k > 0).
Note that K + , K − , and n k are functions of the Nash equilibrium a * , and the alternate joint path choice a, even though for the sake of simplicity we suppress this dependence from the notation. Now any Nash equilibrium a * , has the property that no player can switch from the path their flow takes in a * to a different path without increasing aggregate system delay. Thus, for any individual player's deviation away from a * it holds that,
Adding these inequalities over all players i we obtain
Next we observe that a convex, non-decreasing function c(x) satisfies the following relations, for x ∈ Z + and for all n > 0:
Thus from Equations (7) and (8) we obtain,
We conclude,
or that U (a * ) ≤ U (a). As no other joint path choice does better this implies that the routing solution x(a * ) associated with the Nash equilibrium a * solves problem S. Under strict convexity, we can establish
, which in turn implies that any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game G is strict.
In conjunction with Theorem 1, Lemma 2 allows us to establish the convergence of Algorithm 1 to the optimal solution of the discrete network flow problem S as embodied in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Under strict convexity, sampled joint strategy fictitious play, as described in Algorithm 1, converges almost surely to the optimal solution of the network routing problem, defined by S.
Proof: From Lemma 2 we have that under strict convexity, all Nash equilibria for the game G, defined by Equation (6), are strict thus satisfying Assumption 1. The conclusion follows from the fact (cf. Theorem 1)
that Algorithm 1 converges almost surely to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Numerical Examples: Internet Traffic Assignment
In a computer network setting, a "player" may be created by aggregating flow at an ingress node (point of entry of traffic into a network) into distinct streams according to destination IP address prefix (as discussed in Sridharan et al. (2001) ). The total number of players in a network would then be the sum of players over all ingress nodes. Each player has a set of path choices, with each path being defined as a sequence of links.
If L denotes the set of links in a network then we associate with each link l the link capacity d l (in Mbps), a maximum link utilization parameter κ l ∈ [0, 1) and a cost U l (φ l ) which is a function of the link flow φ l .
The link delay function is given by:
where the first expression in Equation (9) is proportional to the expected waiting time in an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate φ l and service rate d l and the second expression in (9) is an affine term with a slope equal to that of the curve
System-wide or aggregate delay, that we would like to minimize, is then given by l∈L U l (φ l ). Note that this simplifies the computation of system-wide delay as players only need to know the total flow on each link. To further adapt the game scenario to a computer network setting, a player would possess three significant descriptive qualities: an identifying flow label, the mean bandwidth, and the current label switched path (LSP). Sridharan et al. (2001) point out that there are costs associated with classifying traffic according to destination IP address prefix, and also with taking measurements of incoming traffic to gather flow statistics. Classification costs increase with finer granularity of aggregation, or aggregation by prefixes of greater length. Flow measurements place a burden on the router and thus must be performed with economy, but must be taken often enough to provide an accurate account of traffic. Our scheme assumes that responsibility for these processes has been given to edge routers and not to core routers, helping to alleviate some of this burden. Once packets have been aggregated into streams, the stream may be routed on a LSP. Thus, the choice of LSPs between an ingress/egress pair would represent decisions to be made by players. As a proof of concept, we illustrate the applicability of sampled joint strategy fictitious play using a network topology from Elwalid et al. (2001) , shown in Figure 1 . We will henceforth refer to this as the MATE network topology. Nodes labeled 1, 2 and 3 serve as ingress nodes for traffic entering the network.
Experiments with the MATE topology
The egress nodes (points of exit) for these ingress nodes are labeled 10, 11 and 12, respectively. Thus, traffic coming into the network at ingress node 1 exits at egress node 10 and so on. We next describe the setup for the numerical experiments. The core links in the MATE topology, i.e., Core link-1, Core link-2 and Core link-3 are each set to have a capacity of d = 45 Mbps (all other links were capacitated such that delay due to traffic traversing them was negligible). Also, κ l the maximum link utilization parameter is set to 0.9 for all links. Our experiment has 30 streams (10 per ingress node), each with a stream size of 4 Mbps, taking on the role of players. Each player has two actions from which to choose, corresponding to the two LSPs from ingress to corresponding egress node. For example, a player (stream) at ingress node 2 could choose the upper LSP (corresponding to nodes 2-4-7-11) or the lower LSP (nodes 2-6-9-11) on the way to egress node 11. Since all streams are identical, a compact representation of each joint action is as the triplet (n 1 , n 2 , n 3 ), where n i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3} corresponds to the number of flows on Core link -i. As one would expect, the optimal joint action a * for this setting would be represented as (10, 10, 10), i.e., 10 flows on each core link (with U (a * ) = 24). In our implementation of sampled joint strategy fictitious play, two data tables were maintained: (1) a performance table which kept track of the descriptive statistics (mean, standard error) for all joint actions evaluated during the course of an optimization run and (2) a play history which kept track of the M joint actions that were the most recent aggregate best replies. As the play history is empty at the start of any optimization run, common sense dictates that the initializing joint action be one wherein each player routes traffic on its shortest path (this is not only sound engineering judgment but also represents how traffic is actually routed on the Internet today, using OSPF for instance). The initial solution starts off with 20 players utilizing Core link-1, 10 players utilizing Core link-2 and none using Core link-3 (or the joint action (20, 10, 00) ). An immediate outcome of such shortest path routing is the saturation of Core link-1, as all streams from ingress node 1 and 2 use this link to reach their destination egresses (nodes 10 and 11 respectively). Given a stream size of 4 Mbps, it is clear that Link-1 does not possess sufficient capacity to handle flow which could potentially be as large as 80 Mbps. Note however that with proper routing the network is well capacitated to accommodate these traffic levels.
We ran two sets of experiments for the MATE topology: (1) with perfect evaluation of the cost function and (2) with noisy evaluation, without the use of our candidate stopping rule (cf. Section 3.3). For the latter set, we added noise δ t,i uniformly distributed in the interval [−1.936, 1.936 ] to the actual disutility value of a joint action evaluated at time t to represent the situation where a black box simulation is the only way to obtain cost estimates. Thus, the added noise satisfies the properties set forth for Algorithm 2 plot the evolution of the joint action that is the best so far (Figure 3 (a) ) along with the evolution of the best so far's standard error estimate (Figure 3 (b) ). In the noisy case, the optimal solution (10, 10, 10) is revealed within the first 15 iterations and as can be seen the estimate of its standard error gets increasingly refined as the number of iterations increase (and (10, 10, 10 ) is increasing played/sampled). Another interesting feature of the plot for standard error is that larger sizes of the play history seem to provide better estimates for the standard error. A possible heuristic explanation is that with a larger play history, any joint action seen infinitely often is also "more" likely to be sampled, leading to better estimates. Another observation, for both set of experiments, is that among other approximately optimal solutions found, the optimization runs were also able to identify (9, 11, 10) , the next best solution after (10, 10, 10). Although the experiments on the MATE topology provide good results that support our intuition, being a "symmetric" problem (identical link capacities, stream sizes) it is sufficient only as a proof of concept.
Experiments on more complex topologies
Note that solving symmetric problems in a decentralized fashion can be hard unless correlation in decision making is accounted for: otherwise the symmetry can result in players actions being at cross purposes.
Though our algorithm accounts for correlation, its effectiveness in the MATE experiments is also aided by the fact that multiple joint path choices can map to identical total link loads, which results in better estimates and faster identification/validation of optimal solutions. As we may not be able to leverage this feature fully in problems encountered in practice (which may only have partial symmetry) we next provide results from numerical experiments on two larger, asymmetric topologies with more links, players and actions per player. In a realistic deployment of the algorithm for large scale problems on a parallel computing grid it is fully expected that from time to time some components of the best reply vector will be unavailable. Such a situation could arise as a result of nodes in the grid going down, being busy on other tasks, having insufficient resources to compute the best reply, or through message packets containing the best reply getting lost, delayed or corrupted. To further illustrate the applicability of this algorithm, in our serial implementations of Algorithms 1 and 2, we model such eventualities for the MATE-Ex and Clock topologies by having a player compute a best reply to their sampled joint action with probability 1 6 -th at each iteration, otherwise (with probability 5 6 ) their action in the sampled joint action, is simply implemented as proxy for their best reply. Also as opposed to the experiments on the MATE topology, these implementations use the candidate stopping rule (cf. Section 3.3). The deterministic problem instances, being non-linear integer programs, were submitted to the publicly accessible NEOS Server for Optimization (http://www-neos.mcs.anl.gov, Czyzyk et al. (1998) ), which as part of it's default behavior ran each job for 1000 seconds and returned the best solution found by it's solver in that time. We ran our MATLAB implementation of sampled joint strategy fictitious play for the deterministic case for 1000 seconds on a single node in the ASPEN Linux cluster at the University of Virginia (http://www.itc.virginia.edu/research/aspen cluster). In all cases, the obtained solutions were within 6% of the best solution returned by the NEOS solver and Table 2 summarizes the results from these runs. As we were unable to determine the details of the computing platform used by NEOS, we acknowledge that this comparison may be a bit unfair. Nevertheless, given that the solvers deployed on the NEOS server for optimization are of production strength, our numerical results are very encouraging. For the stochastic problem instances (with noisy cost evaluation), we added noise δ t,i uniformly distributed in the interval [−2.738, 2.738] to the actual disutility value of a joint action evaluated at time t so the added noise is zero mean (E[δ t,i ] = 0) with variance, V ar[δ t,i ] = 2.5. We additionally ran Algorithm 2 for a duration of 1500 seconds and Table 3 provides the objective function values of the joint action with the best objective function value and least standard error (the corresponding standard errors are indicated in the parentheses). As can be seen, Algorithm 2 is able to produce relatively high quality solutions within this duration. As an aside, we note that to filter out noise one needs to run Algorithm 2 for longer time periods than that required for Algorithm 1 on deterministic problems. This is not unreasonable, given that in dealing with stochastic problems the only way a solution's quality can be accurately quantified is through its repeated simulation.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a new class of decentralized algorithms, for discrete optimization via simulation, based on the notion of weak inclusive sets and sampled joint strategy fictitious play. Our main results are interesting from a number of different perspectives: First, from a game-theoretic perspective, we have contributed substantially to the understanding of the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm, proving (i) convergence to pure strategy Nash equilibria in the case of perfect evaluation of cost and (ii) convergence to pure strategy Nash equilibria for the case of noisy cost evaluation. Next, from the perspective of global optimization, we have established that the sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm converges almost surely to the optimal solution of discrete network flow problems with convex link cost functions, an important class of optimization models in network traffic engineering. While the formal evaluation of sampled joint strategy fictitious play, as an optimization algorithm, has been in the context of network flows, we have found that the algorithm is generally an effective means of exploring solution spaces associated with large-scale and complex discrete optimization problems, even those that do not possess the special structure of Section 4.1.
As a parting remark, we observe that it is often the case that high fidelity simulations of large scale systems are computationally complex, and it is of considerable practical interest that simulation-based algorithms for discrete optimization be scalable as the number of variables to be controlled increases. In a similar vein, we note that simulation based optimization schemes often require increased sampling to guarantee some form of asymptotic convergence. Consider the sampled fictitious play algorithm analyzed in Lambert et al. (2005) , for instance, where even for deterministic combinatorial optimization, sample sizes need to increase in a polynomial fashion over the number of iterations. The sampled joint strategy fictitious play algorithm proposed in this paper tries to address this tension in the following manner. First, our game theoretic model for decentralized (DSDE) optimization takes advantage of the fact that many large scale systems can be decomposed into a set of distributed parts with independent control authority, yet still acknowledge a system-wide metric for success. Hence we are naturally driven to consider a decentralized framework where parallel computation techniques (think of individual player optimizations being distributed among different processors of a grid computing facility) can be employed to obtain solutions in a faster manner. Second and more importantly, through finite sampling of the relative frequency distribution over joint actions our scheme takes into account correlated decisions, as is the case when simulation output is shared across players. To illustrate, consider the network flow problem earlier but with a large number of "infinitesimal" players. As the aggregate effect of individual decisions determine system performance, we are immediately led forth to allowing players to track the number of users utilizing a link, instead of the joint path choices of all other players. This prescription can be readily translated into conducting a network simulation at each iteration, after which link loads are determined and distributed to all players. The cost savings of this proposal are apparent when we consider that, in a network flow application, the ratio of the number of flows (players) to the number of links is typically large. Thus iteration to iteration players need to keep track of a much smaller vector than one in which they tracked joint actions. Finally, to determine the best reply, a player on receiving the results can compute a shortest path to his or her destination of interest, a computationally appealing prospect that also obviates the player's need to conduct a simulation for each of what could potentially be, a very large number of path choices.
